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HOME FRONT WW2: MYTHS AND REALITIES  
by Rowan Cahill 
 
In October 2013, the right-wing journal Quadrant published the book 
Australia’s Secret War, an account by conservative intellectual Hal 
Colebatch of homefront industrial disruptions by Australian trade unions 
during World War 2. Described as a secret history rescued from “folk 
memory”, one previously suppressed by leftists, it detailed ‘treacherous’ 
industrial actions by unionists that variously denied or delayed vital war 
materials to the frontlines between 1939 and 1945, resulting in the deaths 
of service personnel.  
 
These actions, the argument went, pointed to a deliberate and coordinated 
attempt at sabotaging the war effort by the communist leaderships of the 
unions involved. Maritime unions, in particular the Waterside Workers’ 
Federation (WWF), were the focus of the book.  
 
Some context here….during the mid-1930s and onwards, members of the 
Communist Party of Australia (CPA) came to power within many 
national and local trade unions organisations, particularly in the 
leaderships of unions in strategic industries such as mining, shipping, 
stevedoring. Party membership peaked in 1944 with some 23,000 
members. According to historian Robin Gollan, by 1945 “communists 
held controlling positions in unions with a membership of 275,000 and 
influence in unions with a membership of 480,000 or 40 per cent of all 




In the Colebatch account, and especially amongst his supporters, what we 
are dealing with is a contemporary version of Cold War ideological 
‘analysis’, with sinister hidden agendas imputed wherever they can be, 
and the language blurred so that ‘communist’ becomes ‘Left’…and ‘Left’ 
becomes so inclusive it embraces anything to the left of whatever the 
right-wing position is that is being argued from. Even small ‘l’ liberals 




Aided by the vituperations of shock jock Alan Jones on the airwaves and 
Miranda Devine in the Murdoch press, the Colebatch book quickly 
transformed from a niche publication to a reprint with mainstream 
national release and distribution for the 2013 Christmas market.  
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Quadrant editor and publisher Keith Windschuttle effusively praised the 
book in the December (2013) issue of Quadrant. Arch conservative and 
devout monarchist David Flint followed in the January 2014 issue with a 
lengthy review in which the words “evil”, treachery”, “crimes”, “traitors”, 
“insidious” were used to describe wartime waterfront industrial disputes.  
 
Flint even expressed his wish that martial law had been instituted on 
Australian wartime waterfronts to combat wharfie industrial actions, and 
regarded the alleged American use of submachine-gunfire and stun 
grenades on the Adelaide waterfront in 1942, during an incident allegedly 
involving the mishandling of an American military cargo by Australian 
wharfies, as reasonable.  
 
Subsequent reviews and online comment, much of the latter couched in 
the language of violence and hatred, used the Colebatch account to argue 
that the actions of the wartime unionists were ‘treasonous’ and the 
culprits were never brought to account. The attitude of the unionists, it 
was argued, were such that they considered themselves above and beyond 
the common good, a sense of moral superiority that still characterises 
their modern union counterparts, the latter either the trade union 
movement generally--or specifically maritime workers now organised in 
the Maritime Union of Australia. According to this argument, present day 
unionists and their unions should be held accountable for the sins of the 
past. The strident anti-unionism of the Colebatch account, and the anti-
union hatred manifest in much of the subsequent comment, neatly 
dovetailed with the Abbott government’s anti-union agenda.  
 
The book came with a ‘back story’. It had been in the process of research 
and writing at least before 2007 when it got mentioned in conservative 
attacks on the ABC for screening the mini-series account of the 1998 
MUA-Patrick’s waterfront dispute, Bastard Boys. Colebatch’s then 
unfinished account of wartime ‘sabotage’ and trade union ‘perfidy’ was 
touted as the story ‘the leftist infiltrated/oriented ABC would never tell’. 
Much earlier, Daily Telegraph columnist Michael Duffy (6 January 1999) 
accused Australian wharfies of “corrupt” and “sometimes traitorous” 
conduct during WW2.  
 
For conservative commentator Peter Coleman (Spectator, 14 December 
2013), Australia’s Secret War was Colebatch’s “tribute to his father”, Sir 
Harry (Hal) Gibson Pateshall Colebatch (1872-1953), the short-term 
(one-month) 12
th
 Premier of West Australia who accompanied strike 
breakers onto the waterfront during the bitter Fremantle wharf crisis of 
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1919, an inflammatory action which contributed to the death of trade 
union loyalist Tom Edwards following a police batoning.  
 
For conservatives of the Rightist kind, not only was, and is, the Colebatch 
account the story the Left was and is afraid to, and dared not, tell, but in a 
grim and nasty sense also a case of ‘unfinished business’.  
 




Colebatch makes significant use of interviews and correspondence with 
participants or those at a remove from the action being examined. It is the 
sort of material which Windschuttle has persistently claimed in relation to 
Australian indigenous histories, is notoriously suspect regarding 
authenticity and problems associated with misremembering and the 
anecdotal. Specialist scrutiny by ‘war history’ enthusiasts has raised 
serious questions about some of Colebatch’s sources, evidence, and facts.       
 
Despite Colebatch’s claim to the contrary, industrial disputes and unrest 
in Australian wartime industries and work sites have been researched and 
analysed by scholars of industrial relations and labour history, as has the 
existence of the many strikes and industrial actions on Australian 
waterfronts during the war.  
 
In particular, what Colebatch and his supporters seem unable to accept, is 
what the scholarly literature clearly establishes: that wartime industrial 
actions by waterfront workers were primarily local in origin, variously 
based on local factors and understandings, and occurred despite attempts 
by the communist national leadership of the WWF to curtail them.   
 
Colebatch fails to grasp the realities of what was a complex context and 
industry: a national trade union leadership, relatively new (the communist 
Jim Healy had become General Secretary in 1937), in wartime, based in 
Sydney, overseeing a large national membership organised in some 50 or 
so port-based branches dotted around a huge coastline, each with their 
own leaderships, distinct histories, cultures, politics, practices, port 
characteristics, infrastructures, and work demands.  
 
Further, that the WWF rank and file, far from being communists during 
the war and the following Cold War, tended to be ALP members or 
sympathisers, the interesting point being they supported communist 
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leaderships through to the 1960s because these were seen to deliver the 
goods so far as industrial relations were concerned.   
 
The Colebatch account has maritime workers in its sites as a collective, 
and while making mention of the Seamen’s Union of Australia, possibly 
the most communist of Australia’s wartime unions in terms of leadership 
and rank and file membership, focuses on the wharfies.  
 
This enables the wartime contribution of SUA members to be ignored. 
Between 1939 and 1945, Australian merchant mariners suffered losses of 
at least 386 dead as the result of wartime service, a significant proportion 
of this toll in Australian waters due to enemy mines, and submarine and 
air attacks. During 1942 and 1943 in particular, Australian merchant 
shipping was specifically hunted and targeted in Australian waters by 
Japanese aircraft and submarines.  
 
Overall, hardly a treacherous or inconsequential civilian contribution to 
the war effort.   
 
Indeed, as the McGirr Inquiry into the repatriation needs of the wartime 
Australian merchant marine pointed out in 1989, better late than never, 
during WW2, Australian merchant mariners faced the possibilities of 
death and injury from air attacks, submarines attacks, mines, whenever 
they ventured out of port, without respite, and were in many ways more 
vulnerable and at risk than were members of the armed forces.  
 
Australian merchant vessels were mainly coal-fired, had small crews, did 
not carry professional medical teams, and left smoke and spark trails 
easily detected by hostiles, unlike the mainly oil-fired naval vessels.  
 
Further, merchant ships were not specifically designed for battle, were 
not protected by the weaponry carried by naval vessels, did not have  
armoured plating, nor the speed of naval shipping, nor the special  
watertight bulkheads designed for combat, and nor was the merchant 
marine a workforce specifically trained for combat.    
 
German raiders mined the eastern and southern waters of Australia in 
1940, and Japan the northern waters in 1942. The existence of the 
German mines was only discovered when merchant shipping 
unknowingly sailed into them and became casualties. Mines were a 
constant danger, even post-war in places, due to the inadequate mine-
sweeping capability of the Australian navy, the paucity of intelligence 
data, and the vastness of the Australian coastline.  
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The first merchant marine casualty due to mining in Australian waters 
was the British cargo ship Cambridge off Wilson’s Promontory in 
November 1940, sinking with the loss of one life. The first Australian 
merchant marine casualty was the coastal trader Nimbin, en route for 
Sydney carrying a cargo of plywood and pigs, sinking off Norah Head, on 
the Central coast of NSW, in December 1940, with the loss of seven lives. 
According to the Royal Australian Navy’s official historian, when the 
Nimbin went down, naval authorities explained it as the result of an 
internal explosion, the activities of the German raiders unknown to them 
at the time. It was only when a naval vessel went to the scene of the 
fatality, and found itself in a minefield, that the premise for such 
reasoning was proven false.  
 
In terms of being recognised and included as significant wartime 
contributors and participants, it was not until the mid-1970s that the 
Australian merchant marine was included in Anzac Day marches, and not 
until 1990 that a Merchant Navy Memorial was set up at the Australian 
War Memorial in Canberra. The 22 volume Official History of Australia 





Colebatch and his supporters work on the premise of a patriotic, all-pull-
together, seamless Australian homefront war effort between 1939 and 
1945, in which industrial unrest was a perverse and isolated presence. 
Indeed, according to David Flint in a lengthy Quadrant review of the 
Colebatch book (January 2014), Australia was unique in this regard, the 
industrial troubles and conflict that were part of the Australian homefront 
in WW2, not paralleled in either wartime Britain or the wartime United 




So what did go on regarding industrial conflict?  
 
In wartime Britain, industrial relations was characterised by the ongoing 
class conflict of peacetime. According to social historian Harold L Smith,  
this was so intense that in  
 
some war factories….management and workers appeared to view 
each other as a greater enemy than the Germans.  
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Despite strikes being ruled illegal after July 1940 in Britain, the number 
of industrial disputes and working days lost increased on a yearly basis 
from 1940 through to 1944. According to Smith, the idea that wartime 
Britain was characterised by “social unity and consensus” is an 
exaggeration, developed over time by propagandists, myth makers, and 
historians.   
 
In the wartime United States, unions, generally, supported the war effort;  
but wildcat strikes proliferated. There were 3000 labour strikes in 1942. 
The following year, the number of man-days lost trebled to 13.5 million. 
The number of strikes rose in 1944, but less workers actually went out. 
By mid-August 1945, the total number of man-days lost that year to date 
was 9.6 million. Due to the nature of the statistical criteria adopted by US 
authorities, these figures are probably understated.   
 
So what was the situation in Australia? Before continuing, let me 
emphasise that none of the following is secret, or hidden; it is all in the 
public domain, thoroughly discussed, and thoroughly documented in 
historical and industrial relations’ literature.   
 
During World War 2, industrial disturbances increased in Australia to the 
point of reaching an extent greater that at any time since 1929. Some 2, 
210, 000 man-days were lost during the period 1942-1945, disturbances 
increasing as the military situation improved. The most worrying losses 
were in the coal mining industry, a huge problem for a nation and society 
reliant on coal for power, locomotion, and merchant shipping. 
 
So what was the cause? Treason? Sabotage by militants?  Working class 
bastardry? 
 
Well, no, and for some explanation we only have to go as far as that well 
known ‘radical’ historian Sir Paul Hasluck, and his official account of the 
wartime Australian homefront, written and completed just before he 
became Governor-General of Australia in 1969.  
 
So far as strikes on the wartime homefront are concerned, Hasluck 
explained:  
 
The strikes occurred in all parts of Australia and among many 
groups of workers. Most of them were local disputes over local 
grievances and were quickly settled. A number of them were by 
workers in disregard and in some cases in defiance of their union 
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executives. The only industry in which striking was continuous and 
extensive was coal-mining in New South Wales.  
 
As Hasluck made clear 
 
in spite of the exceptional efforts made by the (Curtin Labor) 
Government and the…..full support of the moderate union leaders 
and the exhortations to greater production from the Left Wing, 
industrial stoppages still occurred.  
 
One of the initiatives of the Curtin Labor government when it came to 
power in October 1941 was to work and consult closely with the trade 
union movement, not only via the ACTU, but also via the leaderships of 
the militant, communist led unions, particularly those in strategic 
industries. Government and the unions attempted to work collaboratively 
with regard to wages and conditions. Trade union leaderships actively 
sought to hold down wage demands, industrial conflict, and encourage 
increased wartime productivity. The reward for this was the promise of 
better conditions, if not a better world, post-war. Indeed, increased post-
war industrial turbulence is in part attributable to unions seeking to 
redress postponed and/or lost conditions.  
 
A personal aside here. When I was working as an historian with the 
Seamen’s Union of Australia in 1970-1972, I met and talked a great deal 
with the then leader E. V. Elliott, who had also been the wartime leader 
of the union from January 1941 onwards, a dyed-in-the-wool and leading 
member of the Communist Party of Australia, a tough and hard man in 
many ways. However, when he recalled WW2, and his role as union 
leader and his membership of the wartime Maritime Industry 
Commission, a Curtin government initiative designed to facilitate the 
smooth wartime running of the maritime industry, and his often personal 
role in ensuring the manning of ships, he came close to tears, saying:  
 
 
I sent men to their deaths; they were in the war zone as soon as 
they left an Australian port; Cahill (the way he always addressed 
me, said with a bit of a stutter, which was a long standing speech 
problem he tried, mainly successfully, to keep under control) the 
battlefront was just outside the Sydney Heads.  
 
According to Hasluck, increased industrial disturbances and lost working 
days cannot be simply explained, causation found in a complexity of ‘real 
life’ factors, including the increased numbers of workers in the wartime 
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workforce, amongst these the extensive employment of women, 
particularly in industries where men were not available to meet the 
production demands of war.  
 
In terms of days lost, generally, absenteeism was a particular problem, 
and this, according to Hasluck, was not necessarily motivated by mischief 
or spite but by real exigencies….genuinely due to illness, injury, 
considerable transport difficulties to and from work, and families simply 
and genuinely trying to survive, juggling the day-to-day demands of work, 
shifts, the difficulties of shopping in the context of time constraints and 
rationing, and child care needs.  
 
So far as industrial disturbance in the coal industry was concerned, that 
too had real causal problems, with coalfields’ trade union memberships 
on the NSW fields in particular, consistently rejecting or resisting both 
Communist and ALP leadership directives and pleas to co-operate with 
the war effort.  
 
On the NSW coalfields, what journalist/historian Edgar Ross termed the 
pre-war ‘fight it out’ approach to industrial relations by both 
managements and workers tended to prevail. Amongst miners there was a 
deep and abiding bitterness towards both employers and the state for 
police violence and bloodshed during the Rothbury struggle in 1929 in 
the Hunter region of NSW. In that struggle police opened fire with their 
revolvers on protesting locked-out miners, wounding some 45 or so and 
killing 29 year old miner Norman Brown.   
 
Working in a traditionally dirty, dangerous, deadly industry, miners 
struggled to meet increased wartime production demands, their efforts 
hampered by the technological backwardness of the mines and their 
industry. Accidents increased; there were cases of employer violations of 
Award conditions; examples too of mine managements harassing miners, 
taking advantage of the miner’s own union’s constant urging of members 
to produce. From 1942 onwards, coal output declined, with stoppages a 
contributing factor. 
 
Post-war, pent up hostilities burst free as a tired and strained mining 
workforce determined to win back and/or secure conditions that had 





By focusing on the waterfront, the Colebatch study encourages a 
gendered image of industrial unrest during WW2. The unpatriotic, 
‘treasonous’ worker is the threatening male ‘thug’ on the waterfront. 
However, Commonwealth Government statistics regarding wartime 
industrial unrest did not differentiate between males and females in the 
auditing process, and arguably females added significantly to the mix.  
During the war, women were encouraged to enter the workforce, many in 
jobs traditionally the preserve of men, this being the only way the male 
dominated armed forces could be formed up, and the only way wartime 
production demands could be met. A detailed study by Gail Reekie (1985)  
of females employed in wartime West Australia (WA) in the clothing and 
textile industries, in the munitions and engineering industries, and in 
nursing, demonstrates the ways their employments fostered industrial 
militancy. The presence of women in the WA civilian workforce 
increased by 18 per cent between 1939-1943; female trade union 
membership increased from 37 per cent in 1940 to 48 per cent in 1945. 
The number of industrial disputes in WA increased tenfold between 1941 
and 1944, the peak years of industrial discontent coinciding with the peak 
period of female employment generally, and especially in the industries 
of greatest female employment.   
 
According to Reekie, the need for women in war work, and their 
employment in jobs traditionally regarded as ‘men’s work’, and the 
setting of the wage rate at between 60-90 per cent of the male rate, 
variously empowered women. Organisationally, they found themselves 
together numerically and in a collective way they had not been previously, 
while the shortage of labour meant that their employment was secure for 
the duration, hence boosting their confidence and bargaining power. All 
of this flowed on to their senses of dignity, worth, and agency, and was 
manifested in a robust approach to industrial relations, especially in 
situations where employer attitudes, despite the war, did not cease to 
regard them as inferiors and ‘less’ than men. Their militancy, argued 
Reekie, represented  
 
resistance to both capitalist hegemony and to the dominant 




The right-wing attack on unionism of the type that informs the Colebatch 
study, seeks to depict the homefront Australian trade union movement, 
especially its militant sector, as one thing, essentially ‘un-Australian’, and 
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the Australian armed forces as another, there being little or no 
commonalities.  
 
However, consider this: 43 per cent of Australian employees were trade 
union members in 1934, this rising to 52 per cent in 1942, the year in 
which mass unemployment of the inter-war period ended via wartime 
manpower planning. Factor in with these statistics the essentially maleist 
nature of trade union membership and of the workforce during the period, 
the wartime need for males in the Armed Forces, which required large 
numbers of women to replace them, and it stands to reason that a 
significant part of the Australian armed forces comprised former trade 
unionists. Add to this an estimated 6000 members of the Australian 
Communist Party, who enlisted as the result of the encouragement of the 
party, especially after 1941, and huge links become apparent.   
 
It becomes reasonable, therefore, to argue that in ‘defending and 
protecting the Australian way of life’ so treasured by war propagandists, 
part of what many in the Australian armed forces were fighting for were 
factors like the right to work, decent wages and conditions, the right to 
organise, and for some, the right to be militant and radical.  
 
Equally, on the homefront, it was the obligation of trade unionists, both in 
leadership roles and in rank-and-files, to protect conditions and build 
their unions, however this was understood (and it is apparent this was 
often interpreted differently at leadership and rank-and-file levels 
respectively), and for union leaderships to ensure that when peace came, 
their unions would be strategically and politically positioned to work for 




In conclusion then, simply this: to assign the tumult of Australian 
wartime industrial relations to the leadership of the trade union movement, 
to a communist plot of some kind, to portray the turmoil as some sort of 
sinister plot, to use words like ‘treason’, ‘sabotage’, to even claim that the 
scale of industrial turmoil in Australia was somehow unique amongst the 
Allied homefronts, flies in the face of fact and reason, and a significant  
body of published research and analysis.  
 
It is on a par with the denial of climate change science, and is at once 
both stupid and malicious.   
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